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what is said literally. "We understand the person who offers the excuse
to mean that he did what he did only because he was unable to do other
wise, or only because he had to do it. And we understand him to mean . . .
that when he did what he did it was not because that was what he really
wanted to do."4 Frankfurt's attempt to explain away what is literally said
is suspect for at least two reasons. First, a person who tells us he did what
he did because he was unable to do otherwise or because he had to do it
might very well have wanted to do what he did, believed that he ought
not do what he wanted to do, and not have done what he did except for
the fact that he was unable not to do it because he was determined to do it.
Second, a person might very well utter these words in a context where his
wanting to do something that is good deterministically led to his doing it.
Because he knows this was the case, he is insisting that he does not deserve
any praise or reward for doing what he did.
As I stated in FSCBQ, I do not know how to resolve the question about
the identity of D and ~AP in any non-question-begging way. But I also
do not think that there is a non-question-begging argument against a
compatibilist view of determinism, alternative possibilities, and moral
responsibility and in support of a libertarian view of these matters. Bor
rowing some terminology from Fischer, I believe that when we come to
the issues of freedom, moral responsibility, determinism, and alternative
possibilities we ultimately reach a "dialectical stalemate" (pp. 166-67). But
even though Fischer's way with regard to these issues is not my way, I am
happy to say that My Way is a wonderful collection of essays by a superb
philosopher. It is a book well worth reading.
NOTES
1. Stewart Goetz, "Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the
Question," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. XXIX, ed. Peter A. French,
Howard Wettstein and John Martin Fischer (Oxford: Blackwell), 2005, pp. 83
105.
2. Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1983), p. 3. Richard Taylor (Metaphysics, 3rd ed. [Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, 1983], p. 34) defines 'determinism' as the principle that "there are ante
cedent conditions . . . given which [something] could not be other than it is."
3. Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,"
Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): p. 838.
4. Ibid.2

Personal Identity in Theological Perspective, ed. Richard Lints, Michael S.
Horton and Mark R. Talbot. Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 2006. vi + 226
pages. $20 (paper).
FRANK B. DILLEY, University of Delaware (Emeritus)
The title of this volume misled this reviewer who was expecting a collec
tion of papers on "Personal Identity in Theological Perspective" to have
at its theme "personal identity" issues—bodily continuity, continuity of
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character, continuity of the soul and the like. Only one paper in this col
lection, contributed by Nancey Murphey, explores such issues. Instead
the theme of this volume is suggested by the subtitle of Richard Lints'
introductory chapter, "Theological Anthropology in Context." The theme
is human nature, not personal identity, and the "theological perspective"
is evangelical and confessionalist. The papers would fit a title such as
"Human Nature in Evangelical and Confessionalist Christian Perspec
tive" but the reviewer can understand why the editors chose the perkier
title, "Personal Identity in Theological Perspective."
These papers were originally presented at a colloquium in Colorado
Springs in 2002, were discussed at length, and the authors were given the
opportunity to revise the original papers. One additional paper, by Stanley
Grenz, was added after the discussions. The theme of the collection is what
it means to be human and all of the papers were written by evangelical or
confessionally oriented Christian thinkers. Differences in orientation can
be found in the papers themselves and were pointed out by Lints in his
introduction, but the papers themselves did not dwell on differences. As
Lints suggests, they were looking for common ground. Also the editors
chose not to present any of the discussions of the papers at the confer
ence because the attempt to capture such discussions "normally makes for
lousy reading." This reader thinks that the discussion might have made
a more exciting volume, and wished that the finished papers had made
more reference to each other.
The opening chapter, "Theological Anthropology in Context" (Richard
Lints), provides an introduction to the various papers and their themes
and is followed by the papers grouped under three categories. "Setting
the Context" includes "Biblical Humanism: the Patristic Convictions"
(Robert Louis Wilken), "Homo theologicus: Aspects of a Lutheran Doctrine
of Man" (William C. Weinrich), "Post-Reformation Reformed Anthropol
ogy" (Michael S. Horton) and "The Social God and the Relational Self:
Toward a Theology of the Imago Dei in the Postmodern Context" (Stanley
J. Grenz). "Significant Challenges" deal with "Nonreductive Physicalism:
Philosophical Challenges" (Nancey Murphy) and "Anthropology, Sexual
ity and Sexual Ethics: The Challenge of Psychology" (Stanton L. Jones and
Mark A. Yarhouse). "Suggestive Proposals" contains "Personal Bodies:
A Theological Anthropological Proposal" (David H. Kelsey), "Learning
from the Ruined Image: Moral Anthropology after the Fall" (Mark R. Tal
bot), "Image and Office: Human Personality and the Covenant" (Michael
S. Horton) and "Imaging and Idolatry: The Sociality of Personhood in the
Canon" (Richard Lints). The subtitles are illuminating and illustrate the
variety of perspectives from which they were written and so I have pro
vided them. Except for the Grenz piece and the two Horton chapters, the
papers seem to have been written specifically for this conference and are
not available elsewhere.
Because some selection has to be made, I have chosen to comment on
the contributions by psychologists and philosophers rather than on the
chapters written by theologians and historians.
Philosopher Nancey Murphy develops her "evangelical physicalism"
in response to three centuries of evangelical endorsement of mind-brain
dualism. She apologizes that she has not yet "been able to provide well-
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considered solutions to all of the problems I have raised" (p. 117). She
claims that her nonreductive physicalism fits well with almost all scien
tists (except for Sir John Eccles) and with almost all secular philosophers
(she says she knows of only one exception), but that Christian philos
ophers are divided between physicalism and dualism (p. 96). Her reli
gious-philosophical project has been to argue for Christian nonreductive
physicalism. Problems she chooses not to address here are Biblical texts
which seem to imply dualism and the issue of "intermediate states,"
and she does note in passing that Christian dualism has had undesirable
consequences in that "it has given Christians something to be concerned
about—the soul and its final destiny—in place of Jesus' concern with the
kingdom of God" (p. 97).
She addresses five problems. The evidential base for physicalism is the
success of science, but science has had trouble explaining the distinctive
ness of human persons. She looks to our neurological complexity and cul
tural development which "together resulted in the capacity for genuine
moral reasoning, including the ability to recognize an objective obligation
to obey the voice of the Creator" (pp. 102-03). Another issue is that of per
sonal identity which is complicated by the problem of having a new and
radically different resurrection body. She favors "character identity" as the
criterion for personal identity rather than material continuity (p. 107). With
respect to free will and mental causation, she proposes that the physical
body has modified itself to provide for both since free will and mental
causation are obviously capacities which we have. She has made the case
here and elsewhere for "evangelical physicalism" and her arguments are
well worth reading.
The other philosopher presented in this collection is Mark Talbot, who
wrote the original paper for this colloquium. Talbot examines common
platitudes about child raising, about wanting to take "the wantonness out
of little human beings" (p. 166), and our expectation that parents assist the
development of self-regulating persons. Our capacity to realize why wan
tonness is unnatural, the use of language, and the development of social
referencing provide natural prolegomena to Christian anthropology. We
are more than our physiologies; we seem to require spirituality as human
beings (p. 172). Our child-raising practices recognize what we naturally
want to become, but also show that our capacity to do so has been ru
ined. As an evangelical, he points out that this natural knowledge does
not substitute for revelation, but is illuminated by it. Redeemed natural
theology, "by starting from Scripture, can identify what is true in unre
generate thinking as well as what even the unregenerated should know
. . . and then deploy those truths in articulating and defending Christian
belief" (p. 174).
In discussing sexual ethics, the psychologists Jones and Yarhouse la
ment evangelical neglect of many social issues other than sexual, as well
as high divorce rates among evangelicals. Not unsurprisingly, they defend
traditional sexuality, endorsing claims that the practice of people who pray
together is highly correlated with sexual satisfaction and have a lower rate
of divorce, and that cohabitation before marriage leads to high divorce
rates, extramarital affairs and less sexual satisfaction in marriage. They
claim that "an immense literature attests to the quality-of-life benefits of
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traditional marriage and of two-parent family arrangements" (p. 130), re
ferring to a recent review of the research by Linda J. Waite and Maggie
Gallagher, The Case for Marriage (New York: Broadway, 2000). If there are
contrary estimates of the value of traditional sexuality in the review of the
literature they cite, the authors do not choose to bring them up. Their dis
cussion of homosexuality is based mainly on Robert A. J. Gagnon, The Bible
and Homosexual Practice (Nashville: Abingdon, 2001). This reviewer was a
bit surprised that they judge that tolerance of homosexuality as valid is "as
grave in some ways as the behavioral choices of the homosexual person"
(pp. 133, 135). It was not clear whether their objection was to tolerance
in the church or also to tolerance by society, but I presume their remarks
were directed at the church.
The papers deal with many dimensions of theological anthropology
from confessionalist and evangelical Christian perspectives, and some
readers may be disappointed, as I was, that if there were differences that
might have surfaced in the discussions among conferees. The editors chose
not to print them, nor did the conferees refer to them in the final versions
of their papers. The papers have variety, are largely expository and, I pre
sume, because they were written for this colloquium, the writers did not
feel a need to engage in issues of justifying their perspectives nor a need to
debate each other in their papers but were engaged in exploring common
ground. Also, the authors made repeated references to the Bible, but did
not explore any differences they might have had in interpreting the Bible.
The book has no index or comprehensive bibliography, but the indi
vidual chapters have extensive footnotes in most cases. The volume con
tains well-written papers, written by the convinced, discussed with others
equally convinced, and now offered by publication to a wider readership.
The book is well produced and inexpensive, and people who want to read
the papers can well afford to purchase it for their personal libraries, but
they should be warned that the theme of the papers is not theological per
spectives on criteria for personal identity over time.

Reason and the Reasons of Faith, ed. Paul J. Griffiths and Reinhard Hutter.
New York: T&T Clark, 2005. Pp. ix + 373. $60.00 (Cloth).
PAUL MACDONALD, Bucknell University
The essays that make up this book are the product of a series of discussions
held by leading systematic theologians between December 2000 and May
2003 at the Center of Theological Inquiry in Princeton, New Jersey. The
goal of these discussions was to address what the editors call the "double
crisis" of faith and reason in late modernity. Faith (which is based on the
authoritative testimony of Christian Scripture and tradition) is in crisis,
they say, because it has been severed from the guiding light of reason, so
construed as a capacity for judgment, argument, and ascertaining truth.
Reason is in crisis because it has lost sight of its most noble task of ascer
taining truth: it has been weighed down (or misguided) by the reigning

